Bureaucratic Reputation

2023
Maor, Moshe, Raanan Sulitzeanu Kenan, and Meital Balmas. 2023. The reputational dividends of collaborating with a highly reputable agency: The case of interagency collaboration between the U.S. FDA and its domestic partner agencies. Public Administration Review 83(3): 639-653. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/puar.13597. Abstract

What reputational dividends in the media, if any, do federal agencies reap from collaboration with a highly reputable agency, such as the FDA? Utilizing a dataset covering 30 U.S. federal agencies over a period of 34 years (1980–2013), we estimate the short and long-term reputational effects of interagency collaboration. Collaboration is measured by the number of memorandums of understanding (MOUs) in effect between each agency and the FDA, while agency reputation in the media is assessed using an automated measure of media-coverage valence (positive/negative tone) for each agency-year. To account for potential reverse and reciprocal causality, we utilize cross-lagged fixed-effects models. We find evidence of moderate rises in reputation in the media due to increased collaboration with the FDA. These effects persist significantly for two years following the end of the collaboration, before declining to null after four years. Employing similar analyses, we furthermore estimate reverse causality – of reputation in the media on the level of consequent collaboration – finding no evidence of such effects.

Replication Files

2022
Maor, Moshe, . 2022. Taking stock: Strategic communication by regulatory agencies as a form of reputation management. In Handbook on Regulatory Authorities, eds. Martino, Maggetti, Fabrizio, Di Mascio, , and Alessandro, Natalini, . Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing, p. 272-283.PDF icon maor_chapter_18_proofs.pdf
2016
Maor, Moshe, . 2016. Missing areas in the bureaucratic reputation framework. Politics and Governance 4(2): 80–90. https://www.cogitatiopress.com/politicsandgovernance/article/view/570.
Maor, Moshe, . 2016. Strategic silence. In The SAGE Encyclopedia of Corporate Reputation, ed. Craig E. Carroll. Thousand Oaks,, CA: SAGE Publications, Inc, p. 823–824. https://sk.sagepub.com/reference/the-sage-encyclopedia-of-corporate-reputation/i10244.xml. PDF icon strategic_silence_sage.pdf
2015
Maor, Moshe,, and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. 2015. Responsive change: Agency output response to reputational threats. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 26(1): 31-44. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/muv001.
Maor, Moshe, . 2015. Theorizing bureaucratic reputation. In Organizational Reputation in the Public Sector, eds. Arild, Wæraas and Maor, Moshe . London: Routledge, p. 17–36.PDF icon theorizing_bureaucratic_reputation.pdf
2013
Maor, Moshe,, and Raanan Sulitzeanu-Kenan. 2013. The Effect of Salient Reputational Threats on the Pace of FDA Enforcement. Governance 26(1): 31-61. https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/abs/10.1111/j.1468-0491.2012.01601.x.
Maor, Moshe,, Sharon Gilad, and Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom. 2013. Organizational reputation, regulatory talk, and strategic silence. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 23(3): 581-608. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mus047.
Gilad, Sharon,, Moshe Maor, and Pazit Ben-Nun Bloom. 2013. Organizational reputation, the content of public allegations, and regulatory communication. Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory 25(2): 451-478. https://doi.org/10.1093/jopart/mut041.